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Abstract
We present HDP-VFL, the first hybrid differentially private (DP) framework for
vertical federated learning (VFL) to demonstrate that it is possible to jointly learn
a generalized linear model (GLM) from vertically partitioned data with only a
negligible cost, w.r.t. training time, accuracy, etc., comparing to idealized non-
private VFL. Our work builds on the recent advances in VFL-based collaborative
training among different organizations which rely on protocols like Homomorphic
Encryption (HE) and Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) to secure computa-
tion and training. In particular, we analyze how VFL’s intermediate result (IR) can
leak private information of the training data during communication and design a
DP-based privacy-preserving algorithm to ensure the data confidentiality of VFL
participants. We mathematically prove that our algorithm not only provides utility
guarantees for VFL, but also offers multi-level privacy, i.e. DP w.r.t. IR and joint
differential privacy (JDP) w.r.t. model weights. Experimental results demonstrate
that our work, under adequate privacy budgets, is quantitatively and qualitatively
similar to GLMs, learned in idealized non-private VFL setting, rather than the
increased cost in memory and processing time in most prior works based on HE or
MPC. Our codes will be released if this paper is accepted.
1 Introduction
Vertical federated learning (VFL)[20] has been recognized as one of the effective solutions for
encouraging enterprise-level data collaborations while respecting data privacy[36], required by the
strict government regulations like Europe’s General Data Privacy Regulations (GDPR[34]). Unlike
horizontal federated learning (HFL)[25, 6] setting in which the decentralized datasets share the same
feature space but little intersection on the sample space, in VFL setting, the datasets of different
organizations share the same or similar sample space but differ in feature space. Therefore the VFL
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participants need to jointly learn a model together[20], rather than independently learn models from
their local data like normal HFL participants do.
The difference in data distribution leads to different focus on data protection in HFL and VFL. In
HFL, gradients, trained with each participant’s local data and vulnerable to information leakage[29],
are sent from each participant to server for a secure aggregation[5]. The numerous participants of
HFL are mostly personal smart phones or edge devices with limited computation power and network
bandwidth, thus the goal of gradient protection in HFL setting is mainly achieved by differential
privacy (DP)[14, 1, 2, 26, 33], secret sharing[5], and so on. In VFL setting, however, few enterprise-
level participants jointly learn a machine learning model with their own data by merely exchanging
intermediate result (IR), e.g. scalar inner product[20] in generalized linear model (GLM). Since IRs
might leak training data information[1, 9], they are mostly protected by additively homomorphic
encryption (HE)[20, 29] and secure multi-party computation (MPC)[27] in existing VFL, thanks to
the sufficient computation power and network bandwidth of enterprise-level participants. In addition,
given by the similar settings and assumptions, most existing VFL algorithms follow traditional privacy-
preserving multi-party machine learning methods[36, 4, 18, 3, 8], by applying Taylor approximation
to the loss functions, so that HE can be adopted to protect the calculation of polynomial tasks in
VFL’s joint training.
We observe several drawbacks of VFL’s data protection using HE. We measure large overhead on
memory cost and processing time with HE, similar to the results in [23]. For example, a VFL-
based logistic regression task takes few minutes to finish training if IR is not securely computed
and transmitted, while an HE version of VFL-based logistic regression takes hours. In addition,
as mentioned in [36], most existing VFL methods require a third-party collaborator to ensure data
confidentiality during training process. Moreover, It is non-trivial task to approximate certain critical
functions, e.g., loss function in machine learning models using only low-degree polynomials before
HE, and naive approximation may lead to big errors and makes the solutions intractable[23]. Although
many research efforts have been devoted to gradient protection with DP in HFL, surprisingly, we
find no prior work on protecting VFL’s data confidentiality using DP. Therefore, we are motivated
to propose the first differentially private framework to enforce the data confidentiality of VFL
participants with negligible cost, in terms of training time, accuracy, and so on.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, to the best of our knowledge, we present HDP-VFL,
the first differentially private framework for VFL. By thoroughly analyzing the sensitivity of VFL’s
IR and conducting perturbation of IR directly within each training iteration among VFL’s participants,
our method doesn’t need to perform Taylor approximation to the loss function, and meanwhile no
HE is required, thus HDP-VFL could greatly boost VFL’s performance. Second, we mathematically
prove that HDP-VFL not only provides utility guarantees for VFL, but also offers multi-level privacy,
i.e. DP w.r.t. IR and JDP w.r.t. model weights, for VFL’s data protection. Third, by not relying on
any third-party collaborator to ensure data confidentiality, HDP-VFL is easy to deploy.
2 Related Works
Although the local raw data is not exposed in FL setting, FL on its own still lacks theoretical privacy
guarantees[33], and may leak sensitive information about the training data[36]. Therefore, the
combination of FL and proper privacy-preserving mechanisms, such as DP[14], HE[30], MPC[17],
etc., is a necessity to alleviate FL’s privacy risks.
Privacy-preserving HFL: Most privacy-preserving HFL systems are realized based on DP, MPC,
and encryption, due to limited computation power and network bandwidth[5]. For example, Bonawitz
et al. [5] proposed a secure aggregation scheme based on MPC to allow server to obtain an aggregation
result without learning data information of each participant. Agarwal et al. [2] proposed cpSGD, a
communication-efficient DP mechanism using binomial noise to avoid floating point representation
issues. McMahan et al. [26] proposed DP-FedAvg, a differentially private version of vanilla FedAvg.
Triastcyn and Faltings [33] proposed Bayesian differential privacy, a relaxation of DP for FL with a
tighter privacy budget so that FL task over population with similarly distributed data could converge
faster than DP-FedAvg. Unlike the existing methods providing gradient-level perturbation, our
method focuses on IR perturbation within each multi-party SGD iteration, which is unique in VFL.
Privacy-preserving VFL: Unlike HFL releases summative private information (e.g. averaged
gradients) w.r.t. some data instances, VFL releases summative private information (e.g. inner-
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products between data and parameters as scalar IR) w.r.t. some dimensions, which requires unique
privacy-preserving solutions. With sufficient computation power and network bandwidth, most
privacy-preserving VFL systems adopted time-consuming and memory-consuming[23] HE or MPC to
protect the IR during joint training[20, 10, 24] to pursue models with lossless prediction performance,
which was assumed to be hard for DP[20] although DP were dominate in traditional research
on privacy-preserving machine learning on vertically partitioned data[13, 28]. Unlike existing
privacy-preserving VFL, our method HDP-VFL proposes using DP to protect the training data of
VFL participants. In addition, we mathematically prove HDP-VFL’s multi-level privacy and utility
guarantees.
3 Preliminaries
This section reviews key definitions.
Vertical Federated Learning (VFL). VFL is applicable to the cases that several datasets, owned by
various enterprise-level parties, share the same or similar sample space, i.e., sample IDs, but differ in
feature space. Besides, only the party launching a specific joint training task owns the target vector.
We define the party with target vector as the “active party” and the others as the “passive party”.
We denote VFL’s datasets as Dm = (Xm,y) = {(X1), . . . , (Xi,y), . . . , (Xm)}, where Xi ∈
Rn×di is the data matrix of the i-th party, and y ∈ Rn×1 is the target vector held by active party.
When a specific VFL task only involves one active party and one passive party, we also denote active
party’s data as (XA,yA) and passive party’s data as (XB) within this paper. Our goal is to support
VFL-based model joint training privately and efficiently, and herein we take generalized linear model
(GLM) as an example. We define a two-party VFL-based objective function as:
ŵ = arg min
w
L(w) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θi,yi) + λg(w), s.t. θi = xiw,∀i. (1)
where n is the number of common entities after VFL’s entity-resolution protocol [20], xi = (xAi ,x
B
i ),
w = (wA,wB), and yi = yAi . w ∈ Rd is the vector of model weights, L is the objective function, `
is the loss function for each data sample, and θi is the natural parameter for sample i. The g(·) is a
regularization term, such as `1 or `2 regularization. To make sure the raw data xAi and x
B
i , and target
vector yAi , are not exposed to each other, meanwhile gradient and loss calculation are still possible at
both parties, the secure version of intermediate result (IR), denoted as Sec[·], needs to be exchanged
between VFL participants in each SGD iteration. Currently existing Sec[·] in VFL is based on HE
[20, 10, 24], and this paper presents a DP-based solution.
Differential Privacy (DP). DP is concerned with whether the output of a computation over a dataset
can leak information about individual entries in the dataset. To prevent leakage, randomness is
introduced into the computation to hide details of individual entries.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [15]). A randomized algorithm A : D → R with domain D and
rangeR satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy if for any two adjacent datasets D,D′ ∈ D that differ by
a single data instance and for any set of outcomes S ⊂ R, the following holds:
P[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp()P[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
The privacy loss pair (, δ) is referred to as the privacy budget/loss, and it quantifies the privacy risk of
algorithm A. The intuition is that it is difficult for a potential attacker to infer whether a certain data
point has been changed in, or added into, the input D based on a change in the output distribution.
Consequently, the information of any single data point is protected. In our VFL setting, for active
party and passive party, (xAi , y
A
i ) and x
B
i are treated as a “single entry” by Definition 1, respectively.
Definition 2 (Joint Differential Privacy [22]). A randomized mechanismM : D → R whose output
is an n-tuple satisfies (, δ)-joint differential privacy if for any party i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, any two
adjacent datasets Di, D′i of party i that differ by a single data instance, all inputs D−i from any
other parties except for party i, and any set of outcomes S ⊂ Rn−1, the following holds:
P[M(Di;D−i)−i ∈ S] ≤ exp()P[M(Di′;D−i)−i ∈ S] + δ.
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The privacy loss pair (, δ) is referred to as the privacy budget/loss, and it quantifies the privacy risk
of mechanismM.
Definition 3 (Sensitivity [15]). The sensitivity of a function f : D → Rd is defined as:
∆2(f) = max
D,D′
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖,
for all datasets D and D′ that differ by at most one instance, where ‖ · ‖ is specified by a particular
mechanism. For example, the Gaussian mechanism [16] requires the `2 norm, and the Laplace
mechanism [15] requires the `1 norm.
In this paper, we adopt the Gaussian mechanism for flexible usage.
Lemma 1 (Gaussian Mechanism [16]). Let f be an arbitrary function generating d-dimensional
outputs. Let  ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary. For c2 > 2ln(1.25/δ), the Gaussian Mechanism with parameter
σ ≥ c∆2f/ is (, δ)-differentially private.
4 HDP-VFL
This section presents our DP framework for VFL and analyzes its privacy and utility guarantees.
Specifically, we present a new analysis of IR perturbation method for VFL-based GLM joint training.
Consider a VFL-based GLM joint training algorithm A with T iterations. For iteration t = 1, . . . , T ,
the IR is exchanged between single active party and passive parties to calculate loss and gradient.
The joint training process won’t stop until the model converges or it reaches the maximum iteration.
We assume each passive party only exchanges Sec[IR] with active party, and active party exchanges
Sec[IR] with all passive parties. In such an assumption, “multi-passive-party” setting can be deemed
as a simple extension to “single-active-passive-party” setting. Algorithm 1 takes “single-active-
passive-party” setting as an example and gives our HDP-VFL algorithm. The IRit denotes the
intermediate result of the GLM in the t-th iteration of i-th party.
4.1 Algorithms
As shown in Algorithm 1, we introduce a differentially private method to calculate Sec[IR] to protect
the training datasets. Unlike existing HE-based Sec[IR] calculation, HDP-VFL doesn’t need to
conduct polynomial approximation on loss function before HE can be applied. Instead, we can simply
calculate IR’s `2 sensitivity and add Gaussian noise correspondingly. In the following sections, we
will instantiate HDP-VFL framework by logistic regression and mathematically prove its multi-level
privacy and utility guarantees. We will then evaluate our method in Section 6.
4.2 Examples of HDP-VFL Framework
We take a popular machine learning method, `2-regularized logistic regression with the `2 regulariza-
tion parameter λ, as an example of our HDP-VFL framework. The objective function is:
L(w) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yixiw)) + λ
2
‖w‖22, yi ∈ {−1,+1},∀i. (2)
Correspondingly, for i ∈ st, each i-th entry of IRAt in Algorithm 1 equals
∂`
∂θi,t
∣∣∣∣
θi,t=xiwAt +Sec[IR
B
t ]i
=
(
1
1 + exp[−yi(xiwAt + Sec[IRBt ]i)]
− 1
)
yi. (3)
Then the update operation with penalty in Algorithm 1 is Pen(w·t,g
·
t, η, λ) = w
·
t − η(g·t + λw·t).
Other parameters are: L = 1, βθ = 0.25, βy = 1.1, ky = 1, which are defined in Section 5.
Examples for other loss functions of GLM and other types of penalties are deferred to Appendix D.
4
Algorithm 1 HDP-VFL
Input: Datasets (XA,y),XB . Privacy loss , δ ≥ 0. Number of epochs e. Number of mini-
batches r. Norm clipping parameter k > 0. Number of iterations T = e ∗ r. Learning rate η.
Loss function `(·, ·) with Lipschitz constant L and smooth parameters βθ, βy. Regularization
parameter λ. Target bound ky .
Output: ŵA,ŵB
1: Conduct entity resolution between parties to obtain common entities and then r.
2: Normalize data samples such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ‖xi‖2 ≤ 1.
3: Initialize the iteration index t = 1.
4: for u = 1 : e do
5: for j = 1 : r do
6: Sample t-th mini-batch Xt with the sample indices st ⊂ {1, . . . , n}.
7: IRBt = X
B
t w
B
t ,
Sec[IRBt ] = IR
B
t +Z
B , where ZB ∼ N (0, σ2AI) is a sample of Gaussian distribution, and
σA =
√
2 log(1.25/δ)(∆2([IR
B
t ]
T
t=1)/), where ∆2([IR
B
t ]
T
t=1) is defined in Lemma 3.
Passive party sends Sec[IRBt ] to active party. // Passive Party
8: IRAt = [
∂`
∂θi,t
|θi,t=xiwAt +Sec[IRBt ]i ]i∈st , where θi,t is defined in Eq. (1).
Sec[IRAt ] = IR
A
t +Z
A, where ZA ∼ N (0, σ2BI) is a sample of Gaussian distribution, and
σB =
√
2 log(1.25/δ)(∆2([IR
A
t ]
T
t=1)/), where ∆2([IR
A
t ]
T
t=1) is defined in Lemma 4.
Active party sends Sec[IRAt ] to passive party. // Active Party
9: Compute gradient gAt = (IR
A
t )
TXAj /b. // Active Party
10: Compute gradient gBt = (Sec[IR
A
t ])
TXBj /b. // Passive Party
11: Update wAt = Pen(w
A
t ,g
A
t , η, λ), w
B
t = Pen(w
B
t ,g
B
t , η, λ).
12: Norm clipping: wAt = w
A
t /max(1,
‖wAt ‖2
k ),w
B
t = w
B
t /max(1,
‖wBt ‖2
k ).
13: Let t = t+ 1.
14: end for
15: end for
5 Theoretical Analyses
This section provides privacy guarantees and utility analyses for Algorithm 1. We first define notations
and make some assumptions.
Definition 4 (∆(·)). We define ∆v := ‖v − v′‖2, where v and v′ are vectors from two adjacent
datasetsD andD′, respectively, that differ by a single data instance. The changed data instance could
be either a pair of (xAi , y
A
i ) from the active party or a x
B
i from the passive party, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Variable spaces. We assume the spaces for model weights and data samples are bounded such that
‖w‖2 ≤ k and ‖xi‖2 ≤ 1,∀i, which is natural from the normalization and norm clipping steps of
Algorithm 1. For each i, we assume that yi has a sub-exponential distribution with parameters (σ, ν)
such that |yi| ≤ ky with high probability of at least
P(|yi| ≤ ky) ≥
{
1− exp(−k2y/σ2), 0 ≤ ky ≤ σ2/ν
1− exp(−ky/ν), ky > σ2/ν,
which can cover a wide range of distributions, including the commonly-encountered Bernoulli,
Poisson, and Gaussian distributions for logistic, Poisson, and least square regressions, respectively.
Properties of objective functions. We assume that the loss function `(·, ·) in Eq. (1) is γ-strongly
convex, β-smooth, and L-Lipschitz-continuous (defined in Appendix A) w.r.t. the model weights w
and βθ-smooth w.r.t. the natural parameter θi,∀i. We also assume ∂`/∂θi is βy-Lipschitz-continuous
w.r.t. yi,∀i. These properties can cover a wide range of loss functions, including logistic, least square,
Huber, `2 support-vector-machines loss, losses for Poisson and Gamma regression, etc.
We first show that the differences resulted from adjacent datasets on wts are bounded.
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Lemma 2 ((∆wt)2 recursion). Assume ∆w0 = 0, then we have for any η ≤ 2β+γ :
(∆wt+1)
2 ≤
{
(1− 2η(b−1)βγb(β+γ) )(∆wt)2 + 4ηLb ∆wt + 4η
2L2
b2 , if t = j ∗ b, j = 0, · · · , e− 1;
(1− 2ηβγβ+γ )(∆wt)2, otherwise.
5.1 Privacy Guarantees
This section proves that the Sec[IRAt ]s and Sec[IR
B
t ]s in HDP-VFL algorithm prevent indirect
information leakage from active party’s raw data (XA,yA) and passive party’s raw data XB re-
spectively. Specifically we calculate the `2-sensitivity of [IRAt ]
T
t=1 and [IR
B
t ]
T
t=1 and prove that the
perturbations make our HDP-VFL algorithm joint differentially private.
Lemma 3 (`2-sensitivity of IRBt s). Let T = e ∗ r be the number of iterations, the `2-sensitivity of
IRBt s in Algorithm 1 is ∆2([IR
B
t ]
T
t=1) =
√
4L2e2Tη2
b +
8kLe2η
b + 4k
2e.
The proofs of both Lemma 2 and 3 are deferred to Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2.
Lemma 4 (`2-sensitivity of IRAt s). Let T = e ∗ r be the number of iterations, the `2-sensitivity of
IRAt s in Algorithm 1 is ∆2([IR
A
t ]
T
t=1) =
√
4β2θL
2e2Tη2
b +
8(βθk+βyky)βθLe2η
b + 4(βθk + βyky)
2e.
The proof of Lemma 4 is deferred to Appendix B.3.
Theorem 1 (DP). Algorithm 1 is (, δ)- differentially private w.r.t [Sec[IRAt ]]Tt=1 and [Sec[IR
B
t ]]
T
t=1.
Theorem 2 (JDP). Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-joint differentially private w.r.t [wAt ]Tt=1 and [wBt ]Tt=1.
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 are deferred to Appendices B.4 and B.5, respectively.
Theorem 1 shows that through Algorithm 1, first, the perturbations in Sec[IRBt ]s in passive party
prevent active party from getting private information about raw data xBi , by observing the changes in
the sequence of Sec[IRBt ]s; then, the perturbations in Sec[IR
A
t ]s in active party prevent passive party
from getting private information about raw data xAi and y
A
i , by observing the changes in sequence
of Sec[IRAt ]s. On the other hand, Theorem 2 further shows that through Algorithm 1, first, the
perturbations in Sec[IRBt ]s in passive party prevent active party from getting private information
about raw data xBi , by observing the changes in the sequence of w
A
t s; then, the perturbations in
Sec[IRAt ]s in active party prevent passive party from getting private information about raw data x
A
i
and yAi , by observing the changes in sequence of w
B
t s.
5.2 Utility Analyses
We build utility analyses for Algorithm 1. Our utility analyses are built upon the error bounds of
inexact proximal-gradient descent presented by Schmidt et al. [32].
Let w∗ = arg minw L(w), and g(·) = ‖ · ‖2. Without loss of generality, we assume that ‖w0 −
w∗‖2 = O(k). Now, we present guarantees regarding both utility and runtime.
Lemma 5. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, denote the gradient error caused by noise by et =
1
b
∑
i∈st ∇`(xiwt, yi) − [gAt ,gBt ], where gAt and gBt are defined in Algorithm 1. It holds that
‖et‖ = O
(√
log(1.25/δ)

√
β2θL
2e2Tη2
b +
2(βθk+βyky)βθLe2η
b + (βθk + βyky)
2e
)
.
Theorem 3. For E = L( 1T
∑T
t=1wt)− L(w∗), we have, with high probability,
E = O
([
k
√
β
T
+ 2
√
T
β
√
log(1.25/δ)

√
β2θL
2e2Tη2
b
+
2(βθk + βyky)βθLe2η
b
+ (βθk + βyky)2e
]2)
.
(4)
The proof of lemma 5 and theorem 3 are deferred to Appendix B.6 and Appendix B.7.
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6 Experiments
This section evaluates the proposed HDP-VFL method instantiated by a VFL-based regularized
logistic regression task. We address three questions: (Q1) How is HDP-VFL’s privacy-accuracy
tradeoff? (Q2) How does HDP-VFL’s hyper-parameters affect HDP-VFL’s accuracy under certain
privacy requirement? (Q3) How is HDP-VFL’s runtime overhead?
6.1 Methods for Comparison
For the regularized logistic regression task, we evaluate five types of methods: 1) single-party method,
which trains a logistic regression model by active party and its dataset alone; 2) traditional centralized
non-FL method, which trains a regularized logistic regression model with all datasets located at a
single party; 3) idealized non-private VFL method, which jointly trains a logistic regression model,
with datasets partitioned at two parties, by exchanging intermediate result IR directly; 4) HE-VFL
method, which jointly trains a logistic regression model, with datasets partitioned at two parties, by a)
approximating loss and gradient to low-degree polynomial representations, and b) exchanging HE-
based polynomial Sec[IR] between parties; 5) our HDP-VFL method, which is similar to idealized
non-private VFL method except that differentially private Sec[IR] is exchanged between parties.
We implement three VFL-based methods in FATE-1.3 [35], an open source platform for VFL research.
For single-party and centralized non-FL methods, we leverage the logistic regression classifier from
sklearn. We use three real-world datasets from UCI Machine Learning Repository[12] for our
evaluation, detailed in Table 1. We split the datasets vertically into two sub-datasets with comparable
amount of attributes and distribute them to active party and passive party respectively. We use test
accuracy as our evaluation metric. All experimental data is average of 10 runs.
Table 1: Datasets for Active Party and Passive Party
Datasets Task # of Samples # of Attributes (Active) # of Attributes (Passive)
Breast[11] Binary Classification 569 11 20
Credit[37] Binary Classification 30000 14 10
Adult[31] Binary Classification 32561 7 8
6.2 Implementation Details
We set λ = 0.001 as default for all our datasets. The epoch number e and weight constraint k are
HDP-VFL’s two important hyper-parameters which will affect IR’s `2 sensitivity. Normally the
larger the sensitivity value, the larger the noise needed to maintain differentially private, and the lower
the accuracy. We tune these hyper-parameters for the best privacy-accuracy tradeoffs. Specifically,
we tune e in [5, 15] and k in [0.1, 1] using 5-fold cross-validation method on the training datasets. We
set δ = 0.01 according to the work of Boyd et al. [7].
6.3 Privacy-Accuracy Tradeoff
First we study HDP-VFL’s tradeoff between the privacy requirement in specific range and the
accuracy of a binary classification task. By adjusting the parameters mentioned in Section 6.2, Figure
1 reports the HDP-VFL’s results on privacy and accuracy tradeoff.
From the results we can see that the best accuracy result HDP-VFL could achieve within the given
privacy  range in [0.001, 10] is comparable to single-party method, centralized method, idealized
non-private VFL method, and HE-VFL method which is deemed as lossless. This indicates that
HDP-VFL could achieve high accuracy when privacy budget is sufficient, e.g. above 10, but low
accuracy, only half of the lossless accuracy, when privacy budget is very tight, e.g. below 0.1. In
practice using our HDP-VFL method, we set  = 1 which achieves acceptable accuracy-privacy
tradeoffs. The privacy-accuracy tradeoff evaluation result on the full range of  are shown in the
supplementary material(Appendix C).
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(a) Breast (b) Credit (c) Adult
Figure 1: HDP-VFL’s privacy-accuracy tradeoff results using public datasets. We set mini-batch size
b = 3200, λ = 0.001, epoch number e = 10, and weight constraint k = 1.
6.4 Effects of Hyper-parameters
Then we study how the hyper-parameters affect its accuracy under certain privacy requirement. For
each hyper-parameter under a given range, e.g. range in Section 6.2, we choose three values, e.g.,
lower bound, upper bound, and a middle value, to study the privacy-accuracy tradeoffs. Figure 2
shows the results of tuning hyper-parameters epoch number e and weight constraint k.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Privacy-accuracy tradeoff when tuning hyper-parameters of HDP-VFL on Breast dataset.
From the results we can see that under different privacy budget, HDP-VFL could achieve different
accuracy results with different hyper-parameter value. For example, by changing e from 5 to 15
under  = 1, HDP-VFL’s accuracy drops from 0.9 to around 0.6. Similarly, by changing k from 0.1
to 0.5, the accuracy increases from 0.5 to around 0.9. The reason behind this is that HDP-VFL’s
hyper-parameters affect IR’s `2 sensitivity, as analyzed in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. This also indicates
that under certain privacy budget, the hyper-parameter tuning should be targeting at minimizing IR’s
`2 sensitivity.
6.5 Runtime Overhead
(a) (b)
Figure 3: The runtime overhead of idealized non-private VFL, HE-VFL, and HDP-VFL. In (a), we
change the number of epochs from 1 to 10 and set the size of dataset to 10000. In (b), we vary the
dataset size from 10,000 to 100,000 and set the number of epochs to 1.
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Finally we study HDP-VFL’s runtime overhead. We mainly compare runtime overhead of ide-
alized non-private VFL, HE-VFL, and HDP-VFL. From the result in Figure 3 we can see that
HDP-VFL achieve the similar runtime overhead as the idealized non-private VFL, whereas HE-VFL
has the largest runtime overhead, roughly 2 ∼ 3 times slower than both non-private VFL and JDP-
VFL. More importantly, we can see the runtime overheads of three VFL methods are proportional to
the number of epochs and samples. This result strongly indicates that HDP-VFL could significantly
save joint training time under VFL setting where both parties have large amount of data samples.
7 Conclusions
Privacy-preserving vertical federated learning (VFL) is one of the effective solutions for enterprise-
level data collaborations while respecting data privacy. However, the commonly used HE-based VFL
suffers from the increased cost in memory and processing time when the number of training samples
is huge. This paper studies this issue and presents HDP-VFL, the first differentially private framework
for VFL. By analyzing the sensitivity of VFL’s intermediate result (IR) and conducting perturbation
of IR directly within each training iteration, HDP-VFL doesn’t need the Taylor approximation step
and the third-party collaborator of HE-VFL, thus HDP-VFL is easy to deploy. We mathematically
prove that HDP-VFL provides multi-level privacy and utility guarantees. Experimental results show
the effectiveness of HDP-VFL.
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Broader Impact
As any federated learning related research which trades communication efficiency and training
time for data privacy and thus has an impact on energy consumption, our work, which focuses on
acceleration of the vertical federated training process without compromising privacy guarantees, is
no exception. Specifically, this work has a positive impact on society to respect data privacy, by
complying with government regulations like GDPR[34], when conducting collaborative machine
learning tasks on personal data or enterprise data. At the same time, this work may have some negative
consequences: 1) our work uses differentially private method and mathematical proofs to replace
the time-consuming and memory-consuming homomorphic encryption based privacy-preserving
federated training process, thus it may be difficult, when privacy budget is abnormally tight, to gain a
lossless joint model as homomorphic encryption based vertical federated learning (VFL); 2) the low
performance joint model, under abnormally tight privacy budget, may fail to deliver the expected
outcomes for data collaboration between organizations; 3) our method inherits the same limitation
of existing VFL, which requires datasets of organizations have to share the same or similar sample
space but differ in feature space. Furthermore, we should be cautious of the fact that our method only
protects enterprise data, and how enterprise data is collect from personal data is beyond the scope of
this work. Finally, this work does leverage biases in the data, which is the primary task of this work.
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A Definitions of Properties for Loss Functions
Definition 5. Let f : W → R be a function, where W is a hypothesis space equipped with the
standard inner product and `2 norm ‖ · ‖ :
1) f is L-Lipschitz if for any u, v ∈ W ,
‖f(u)− f(v)‖ ≤ L‖u− v‖;
2) f is β-smooth if
‖∇f(u)−∇f(v)‖ ≤ β‖u− v‖;
3) f is γ-strongly convex if
f(u) ≥ f(v) + 〈∇f(v), u− v〉+ γ
2
‖u− v‖2.
Post-Processing immunity. This property helps us safely use the output of a differentially private
algorithm without additional information leaking, as long as we do not touch the dataset D again.
Property 1 (Post-Processing immunity. Proposition 2.1 in Dwork et al. [15]). Let algorithmA1(B1) :
D → I1 ∈ R be an (, δ) - differential privacy algorithm, and let f : R → R′ be an arbitrary
mapping. Then, algorithm A2(B2) : D → I2 ∈ R′ is still (, δ) - differentially private, i.e., for any
set S ⊆ R,
P(I2 ∈ S | B2 = D) ≤ eP(I2 ∈ S | B2 = D′) + δ.
B Proof of Results In The Main Text
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2 [(∆wt)2 recursion]
Proof. Let S denote the mini-batch of data with the sample indices s ∈ {1, . . . , n} and |s| = b,
and let wt denote the model weights in the t-th step of HDP-VFL’s joint training described in
Algorithm 1. Let F(wt, S) = 1b
∑
i∈st `(wt,xi) denote the average loss function for S. Let S
′
be the “neighboring data” of S, and let w′t be the model weights trained from S ′. To calculate
the recursion of (∆wt)2, consider two cases of S and S′: 1) S is not changed in the t-th step of
HDP-VFL, thus S = S′; 2) S and S′ are neighboring data differing in just one element xi → x′i or
(xi, yi) → (x′i, y′i). We omit y′i when (xi, yi) change to (x′i, y′i) for short. Following the proof of
Lemma 3.7.3 of Hardt et al. [19] we have:
Case 1): no data instance in S is changed, we have
(∆wt+1)
2 =‖wt+1 −w′t+1‖2
=‖wt − η∇F(wt, S)−w′t + η∇F(w′t, S)‖2
=‖wt −w′t‖2 + η2‖∇F(w′t, S)−∇F(wt, S)‖2
− 2η〈wt −w′t,∇F(w′t, S)−∇F(wt, S)〉
=‖wt −w′t‖2 + η2‖
1
b
b∑
i=1
(∇`(wt,xi)−∇`(w′t,xi))‖2
− 2η〈wt −w′t,
1
b
b∑
i=1
(∇`(wt,xi)−∇`(w′t,xi))〉
≤(1− 2 ηβγ
β + γ
)(∆wt)
2 − ( 2η
β + γ
− η2)‖1
b
b∑
i=1
(∇`(wt,xi)−∇`(w′t,xi))‖2
≤(1− 2 ηβγ
β + γ
)(∆wt)
2,
where the first inequality, using the following inequality:
〈wt −w′t,∇`(wt,x)−∇`(w′t,x)〉 ≥
βγ
β + γ
‖wt −w′t‖2 +
1
β + γ
‖∇`(wt,x)−∇`(w′t,x)‖2.
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Case 2): one data instance in S is changed, we have
(∆wt+1)
2 =‖wt+1 −w′t+1‖2
=‖wt − η∇F(wt, S)−w′t + η∇F(w′t, S′)‖2
=‖wt −w′t‖2 + η2‖∇F(w′t, S′)−∇F(wt, S)‖2 − 2η〈wt −w′t,∇F(w′t, S′)
−∇F(wt, S)〉
≤‖wt −w′t‖2 + η2‖
1
b
b−1∑
i=1
(∇`(wt,xi)
−∇`(w′t,xi))‖2 − 2η〈wt −w′t,
1
b
b−1∑
i=1
(∇`(wt,xi)−∇`(w′t,xi))〉
+ η2‖1
b
(∇`(wt,xi)−∇`(w′t,x′i))‖2 − 2η〈wt −w′t,
1
b
(∇`(wt,xi)−∇`(w′t,x′i))〉
≤(1− 2η(b− 1)βγ
b(β + γ)
)(∆wt)
2 − ( 2η
β + γ
− η2)‖1
b
b−1∑
i=1
(∇`(wt,xi)−∇`(w′t,xi))‖2
+ η2‖1
b
(∇`(wt,xi)−∇`(w′t,x′i))‖2 − 2η〈wt −w′t,
1
b
(∇`(wt,xi)−∇`(w′t,x′i))〉
≤(1− 2η(b− 1)βγ
b(β + γ)
)(∆wt)
2 +
4ηL
b
∆wt +
4η2L2
b2
.
In summary, the recursion about ∆wt is:
(∆wt+1)
2 ≤
{
(1− 2η(b−1)βγb(β+γ) )(∆wt)2 + 4ηLb ∆wt + 4η
2L2
b2 , if t = j ∗ b, j = 0, · · · , e− 1;
(1− 2ηβγβ+γ )(∆wt)2, otherwise.
From the above recursion we can know that, (∆wt+1)2 ≤ (∆wt)2 for Case 1) and (∆wt+1)2 ≤
(∆wt +
2ηL
b )
2 in Case 2). Consider the assumption ∆w0 = 0, then we have (∆wT )2 ≤ ( 2eηLb )2.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3 [`2-sensitivity of IRBt s]
Proof. Let b be the mini-batch size, r be the number of mini-batches, e be the number of epochs,
T = r ∗ e, ‖x‖ ≤ 1, ‖wB‖ ≤ k. S and S′ are neighboring data differing in just one element
xBi → x′iB . Similar to B.1, consider two cases of S and S′: 1) S is not changed in the t-th step of
HDP-VFL, thus S = S′; 2) S and S′ are neighboring data differing in just one element xBi → x′iB .
First, consider the ∆2(IRBt ) in passive party’s single step:
Case 1): xBi is unchanged:
∆(IRBt ) =
√√√√ b∑
i=1
(wBt x
B
i −w′tBxBi )2
≤
√√√√ b∑
i=1
(‖xBi ‖‖wBt −wB′t ‖)2
≤
√
b(∆wt)2.
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Case 2): xBi → x′iB :
∆(IRBt ) =
√∑
i′ 6=i
(wBt x
B
i′ −w′tBxBi′ )2 + (wBt xi −w′tBx′iB)2
≤
√∑
i′ 6=i
(wBt x
B
i′ −w′tBxBi′ )2 + (|wBt xi −wBt x′iB |+ |wBt xi −w′tBxi|)2
≤
√
(b− 1)(∆wt)2 + (2k + ∆wt)2
=
√
b(∆wt)2 + 4k∆wt + 4k2.
Then, consider multiple steps for the passive party:
∆([IRBt ]
T
t=1) =
√√√√ T∑
t=1
(∆(IRBt ))
2
≤
√
(T − e)b(∆wT )2 + e(b(∆wT )2 + 4k∆wT + 4k2).
Combining the proof of lemma 2, we have:
∆([IRBt ]
T
t=1) ≤
√
T (2eηL)2
b
+
8ke2ηL
b
+ 4ek2
=
√
4L2e2Tη2
b
+
8kLe2η
b
+ 4k2e
= ∆2([IR
B
t ]
T
t=1).
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4 [`2-sensitivity of IRAt s]
Proof. Consider IRAt = [h(wt,xi, yi)]i∈st , where st is the indices of the mini-batch for the t-th
step, and
h(wt,xi, yi) =
∂`
∂θi,t
∣∣∣∣
θi,t=xiwAt +Sec[IR
B
t ]i
.
Let h(·) denote h w.r.t. the enclosed variable.
Assume there exist constants βy, βx, βw > 0, such that for all y, y′,x,x′,w,w′
|h(y)− h(y′)| ≤ βy|y − y′|
‖h(x)− h(x′)‖ ≤ βx‖x− x′‖
‖h(w)− h(w′)‖ ≤ βw‖w −w′‖.
For generalized linear model, θ = xw. Because `(·, ·) is βθ-smooth w.r.t. θ, then
∂`
∂θ∂x
=
∂`
∂θ∂θ
∂θ
∂x
≤ βθ‖w‖ ≤ βθk,
∂`
∂θ∂w
=
∂`
∂θ∂θ
∂θ
∂w
≤ βθ‖x‖ ≤ βθ.
Therefore, we have βx = βθk, βw = βθ.
First, consider one step for the active party. We consider two cases:
Case 1): no instance is changed, we have:
∆([h(wt,xi, yi)]i∈st) =
√∑
i∈st
(h(wt, yi)− h(w′t, yi))2
≤
√
b(βw∆wt)2.
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Case 2): the i-th instance is changed, i.e., (xi, yi)→ (x′i, y′i) we have:
[∆([h(xi,wt, yi)]i∈st)]
2
=
∑
i′ 6=i
(h(wt,xi′ , yi′)− h(w′t,xi′ , yi′))2 + (|h(wt,xi, yi)− h(w′t,x′i, y′i)|)2
≤(b− 1)(βw∆wt)2 + (h(wt,xi, yi)− h(w′t,xi, yi)
+ h(w′t,xi, yi)− h(x′i,w′t, yi) + h(x′i,w′t, yi)− h(w′t,x′i, y′i))2
≤(b− 1)(βw∆wt)2 + (βw∆wt + 2βx + 2βyky)2
=b(βw∆wt)
2 + 2(2βx + 2βyky)βw∆wt + (2βx + 2βyky)
2.
Then, consider multiple steps for the active party:
[∆([IRAt ]
T
t=1)]
2
=
T∑
t=1
(∆([h(xi,wt, yi)]i∈st))
2
≤ (T − e)b(βw∆wT )2 + e(b(βw∆wT )2 + 2(2βx + 2βyky)βw∆wT + (2βx + 2βyky)2)
≤ Tb(βw∆wT )2 + e(2(2βx + 2βyky)βw∆wT + (2βx + 2βyky)2)
≤ Tβ2w
4e2η2L2
b
+ (2βx + 2βyky)βw
4e2ηL
b
+ e(2βx + 2βyky)
2
= 4β2θL
2 e
2Tη2
b
+ 8(βθk + βyky)βθL
e2η
b
+ 4(βθk + βyky)
2e
= [∆2([IR
A
t ]
T
t=1)]
2,
where for the second inequality, use the proof of lemma 2.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 1 [HDP-VFL’s Differential Privacy Guarantees]
Proof. For the passive party, the view of the active party includes [Sec[IRBt ]]
T
t=1. Because we add
perturbation to each element of the sequence by the `2 sensitivity of [IRBt ]
T
t=1, i.e., ∆2([IR
B
t ]
T
t=1)
defined in Lemma 3, using the Gaussian Mechanism introduced in Lemma 1 with the standard
deviation of
√
2 log(1.25/δ)
∆2([IR
B
t ]
T
t=1)
 , then by Lemma 1 we have for all adjacent databases
DB , D′B that differ in a single data instance xBi → x′iB , and for any set S ∈ RT×b, the Algorithm 1
satisfies:
P([Sec[IRBt ]]Tt=1 ∈ S|DB) ≤ exp()P([Sec[IRBt ]]Tt=1 ∈ S|D′B) + δ.
Similarly, for the active party, the view of the passive party includes [Sec[IRAt ]]
T
t=1. Because we add
perturbation to each element of the sequence by the `2 sensitivity of [IRAt ]
T
t=1, i.e., ∆2([IR
A
t ]
T
t=1)
defined in Lemma 4, using the Gaussian Mechanism introduced in Lemma 1 with the standard
deviation of
√
2 log(1.25/δ)
∆2([IR
A
t ]
T
t=1)
 , then by Lemma 1 we have for all adjacent databases
DA, D′A that differ in a single data instance (xAi , y
A
i )→ (x′iA, y′iA), and for any set S ∈ RT×b, the
Algorithm 1 satisfies:
P([Sec[IRAt ]]Tt=1 ∈ S|DA) ≤ exp()P([Sec[IRAt ]]Tt=1 ∈ S|D′A) + δ.
Such properties can be easily demonstrated to hold for multiple passive parties.
Then, according to the definition 1, Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-differentially private w.r.t [Sec[IRAt ]]
T
t=1
and [Sec[IRBt ]]
T
t=1.
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B.5 Proof of Theorem 2 [HDP-VFL’s Joint Differential Privacy Guarantees]
Proof. For the passive party, the view of the active party includes [wAt ]
T
t=1. Since the mapping
Sec[IRBt ]→ wAt does not touch any unperturbed sensitive information of DB , the Post-Processing
immunity property (property 1) can be applied such that combining the proof of Theorem 1, we have
for all adjacent databases DB , D′B that differ in a single data instance xBi → x′iB , and for any set
S ∈ RT×d, the Algorithm 1 satisfies:
P([wAt ]Tt=1 ∈ S|DB , DA) ≤ exp()P([wAt ]Tt=1 ∈ S|D′B , DA) + δ.
Similarly, for the active party, the view of the passive party includes [wBt ]
T
t=1. Since the mapping
Sec[IRAt ]→ wBt does not touch any unperturbed sensitive information of DA, the Post-Processing
immunity property (property 1) can be applied such that combining the proof of Theorem 1, we have
for all adjacent databases DA, D′A that differ in a single data instance xAi → x′iA, and for any set
S ∈ RT×d, the Algorithm 1 satisfies:
P([wBt ]Tt=1 ∈ S|DA, DB) ≤ exp()P([wBt ]Tt=1 ∈ S|D′A, DB) + δ.
Such properties can be easily demonstrated to hold for multiple passive parties.
Then, according to the definition 2, Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-joint differentially private w.r.t [wAt ]
T
t=1 and
[wBt ]
T
t=1.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 5 [Utility Analyses]
Proof. In the t-th step of HDP-VFL, the gradient error caused by the noisy data (IR) is:
‖et‖2 =
∥∥∥∥1b∑
i∈st
∇`(xiwt, yi)− [gAt ,gBt ]
∥∥∥∥
2
≤1
b
∥∥∥∥∑
i∈st
h(xiwt, yi)xi −
∑
i∈st
(
h(xiw
′
t + z
B
i , yi) + z
A
i
)
xi
∥∥∥∥
2
=
1
b
∥∥∥∥∑
i∈st
xi
[
h(xiwt, yi)− h(xiw′t + zBi , yi)− zAi
]∥∥∥∥
2
≤1
b
∑
i∈st
∣∣∣∣h(xiwt, yi)− h(xiw′t + zBi , yi)− zAi ∣∣∣∣
≤1
b
∑
i∈st
∣∣∣∣h(xiwt, yi)− h(xiw′t + zBi , yi)∣∣∣∣+ |zAi |
≤1
b
∑
i∈st
βθ|xiwt − xiw′t − zBi |+ |zAi |
≤1
b
∑
i∈st
βθ(‖xi‖‖wt −w′t‖+ |zBi |) + |zAi |
≤1
b
∑
i∈st
βθ(2k + |zBi |) + |zAi |.
Because zAi ∼ N (0, σ2A), zBi ∼ N (0, σ2B), σA =
√
2 log(1.25/δ)
∆2([IR
A
t ]
T
t=1)
 , and σB =√
2 log(1.25/δ)
∆2([IR
B
t ]
T
t=1)
 . According to tail inequality of Gaussian variable z ∼ N (0, σ2)
such that P (|z| ≤ v) ≥ 1−
√
2σ√
piv
e−
v2
2σ2 for z > 0. Then for a constant C > 0, with high probability
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of at least 1−
√
2√
piC
e−
C2
2 we have: |z| ≤ Cσ = O(σ), then we have:
‖et‖ =O
(√
2 log(1.25/δ)

[
βθ
(
2k +
√
4L2e2Tη2
b
+
8kLe2η
b
+ 4k2e
)
+
√
4β2θL
2
e2Tη2
b
+ 8(βθk + βyky)βθL
e2η
b
+ 4(βθk + βyky)2e
])
=O
(√
2 log(1.25/δ)

[√
4β2θL
2e2Tη2
b
+
8kβ2θLe
2η
b
+ 4β2θk
2e
+
√
4β2θL
2
e2Tη2
b
+ 8(βθk + βyky)βθL
e2η
b
+ 4(βθk + βyky)2e
])
=O
(√
2 log(1.25/δ)

√
4β2θL
2
e2Tη2
b
+ 8(βθk + βyky)βθL
e2η
b
+ 4(βθk + βyky)2e
)
=O
(√
log(1.25/δ)

√
β2θL
2e2Tη2
b
+
2(βθk + βyky)βθLe2η
b
+ (βθk + βyky)2e
)
.
B.7 Proof of Theorem 3 [Utility Analyses]
Proof. Use Proposition 1 of Schmidt et al. [32], we have:
L
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
wt
)
− L(w∗) ≤ β
2T
(
‖w0 −w∗‖+ 2
T∑
t=1
‖et‖
β
)2
.
Then we replace the gradient error in Proposition 1 with the ‖et‖ calculated in lemma 5, and we get:
L
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
wi
)
− L(w∗) = O
([
k
√
β
T
+ 2
√
T
β
(√
log(1.25/δ)

√
β2θL
2e2Tη2
b
+
2(βθk + βyky)βθLe2η
b
+ (βθk + βyky)2e
)]2)
.
C Privacy-Accuracy Tradeoff
In this section, we report the test-accuracy results on the full range of  in [0.001, 1000], as mentioned
in Section 6.2, in Figure4. From the results we can see that HDP-VFL’s accuracy is comparable to
other evaluated methods if the privacy budget is sufficient, e.g., above 1.
(a) Breast (b) Credit (c) Adult
Figure 4: HDP-VFL’s privacy-accuracy tradeoff results using public dataset. We set mini-batch size
b = 3200, λ = 0.001, epoch number e = 10, weight constraint k = 1.
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D Extensions To Other Loss Functions and Penalties
This section introduces additional loss functions and penalties which support the mainstream machine
learning tasks. We show that HDP-VFL in Algorithm 1 can cover these commonly-encountered
objective functions by merely changing some parameters, and the theoretical results still hold.
D.1 Extensions To Other Loss Functions
This section first introduces two additional losses for linear regression and classification, respec-
tively, and then introduces losses for general applications, including Poisson regression and Gamma
regression.
D.1.1 Least Square Loss
The least square loss is often used for linear regression which is widely applied for continuous-variable
prediction. The loss function is as follows.
`(xiw, yi) = (yi − xiw)2, yi ∈ R. (5)
Correspondingly, for i ∈ st, each i-th entry of IRAt in Algorithm 1 equals
∂`
∂θi,t
∣∣∣∣
θi,t=xiwAt +Sec[IR
B
t ]i
= −2(yi − xiwAt − Sec[IRBt ]i)). (6)
We can normalize the targets by subtracting the mean and dividing the standard deviance to approx-
imate standard normal variables, then with high probability, other parameters are: L = 6, βθ =
2, βy = 2, ky = 3.
D.1.2 `2-loss Support Vector Machine
The support vector machine is widely applied for classification. Enjoying smooth properties, the
`2-loss support vector machine is popular. The loss function is as follows.
`(xiw, yi) = (max(0, 1− yixiw))2, yi ∈ {−1,+1}. (7)
Correspondingly, for i ∈ st, each i-th entry of IRAt in Algorithm 1 equals
∂`
∂θi,t
∣∣∣∣
θi,t=xiwAt +Sec[IR
B
t ]i
= −2yi(max(0, 1− yi(xiwAt + Sec[IRBt ]i))). (8)
Other parameters are: L = 2, βθ = 2, βy = 2, ky = 1.
D.1.3 Losses for The Exponential Dispersion Family
For general applications, this section introduce a type of loss function that follow a distribution from
the exponential dispersion family [21]:
`(yi; θi, φ) =
yiθi − b(θi)
a(φ)
+ c(yi;φ), (9)
where θi = xiw is the natural parameter, φ is the dispersion parameter, and a(·), b(·), c(·) are
known functions determined by the specific distribution, with some abuse of notation. This type
of loss function covers a wide range of distribution, including Bernoulli, Normal, Poisson, and
Gamma distributions for logistic regression, least square regression, Poisson regression, and Gamma
regression, respectively. The specific forms of a(·), b(·), c(·) for these distributions are listed in
Table 2.
Correspondingly, for i ∈ st, each i-th entry of IRAt in Algorithm 1 equals
∂`
∂θi,t
∣∣∣∣
θi,t=xiwAt +Sec[IR
B
t ]i
=
yi − b′(xiwAt + Sec[IRBt ]i)
a(φ)
. (10)
Other parameters are: L = ky/a(φ), βθ = sup |b′′(·)|, βy = 1/a(φ).
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Table 2: Some common distributions in the exponential dispersion family.
Distribution θ φ a(φ) b(θ) c(y;φ)
Bernoulli(p) log{p(1− p)−1} 1 1 log(1 + eθ) 0
Normal(µ, σ2) µ σ2 φ θ2/2 −(y2φ−1 + log 2pi)/2
Poisson(λ) log λ 1 1 eθ − log y!
Gamma(α, β) −β/α 1/α φ − log(−θ) log(ααyα−1/Γ(α))
D.2 Extensions To Other Penalties
This section introduces two popular penalties. Since these penalties result in element-wise operations
which do not involve data instances, no additional privacy concern is required to address. Therefore,
the privacy and utility bounds still hold.
D.2.1 `1 Norm Penalty
`1 norm penalty is popular to introduce sparseness into model weights for interpretation or information
compression. For a `1 norm penalty λ‖w‖1, one can update by proximal operators:
Pen(w·t,g
·
t, η, λ) = sign(w˜
·
t) max{0, |w˜·t| − ηλ}
w˜·t = w
·
t − ηg·t.
D.2.2 Elastic Net Penalty
Elastic net penalty is effective to achieve both sparseness and accurate estimation, which is a
compromise between `1 and `2 norm regularization.
For an elastic net penalty norm penalty λ[‖w‖1 + (µ/2)‖w‖22], one can also update by proximal
operators:
Pen(w·t,g
·
t, η, λ) =
1
1 + ηλµ
sign(w˜·t) max{0, |w˜·t| − ηλ}
w˜·t = w
·
t − ηg·t.
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